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OPINION 
____________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant James Meyer 
(“Plaintiff” or “Meyer”), a Union Railroad employee for 
approximately 31 years, purchased a credit disability 
insurance policy from Appellant CUNA Mutual Group 
(“CUNA”) in connection with the financing by the URE 
Federal Credit Union (the “credit union”) of an automobile 
Meyer purchased.  The policy would make the car loan 
payment on Meyer‟s behalf in the event he was deemed 
disabled.  Following an injury on the job, Meyer received, 
pursuant to the policy, disability benefits in the form of credit 
union payments on the loan for his vehicle.  After covering 
Meyer‟s payments for approximately three years, CUNA 
notified him that it would not continue to pay his disability 
benefits.  CUNA found that Meyer no longer met the 
definition of Total Disability, as defined under CUNA‟s 
policy.   
Meyer filed a complaint in the District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania on his own behalf and on 
behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, each 
claiming disability insurance benefits that had been initially 
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granted and later denied under credit disability insurance 
policies that had been purchased from CUNA.  The principal 
claim asserted a breach of contract, pursuant to the credit 
disability insurance policy.   
Both parties filed cross-motions seeking the grant of 
summary judgment.  The crux of the dueling motions 
involved the definition of Total Disability.  The District Court 
granted Meyer‟s motion for partial summary judgment and 
granted in part CUNA‟s motion for summary judgment.  
Specifically, the District Court found the definition of the 
term “Total Disability” ambiguous and therefore construed it 
in favor of Meyer, the insured.   
Before the Court entered its Final Judgment, it asked 
the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issues of 
estoppel, waiver, prejudgment interest, and a claims process 
related to resolution of the claims.  Based on the Court‟s 
summary judgment finding that the more inclusive 
interpretation of total disability prevailed, Meyer argued that 
CUNA had either waived its right to request medical 
information from class members to show their respective 
disability status during the requisite time period because 
CUNA told them they no longer qualified or should be 
estopped from doing so in the claims process.  He also argued 
that class members should be awarded prejudgment interest 
on their claims.   
The Court entered a Permanent Injunction and Final 
Judgment setting up a claims review process for former class 
members.  It rejected Meyer‟s claims for waiver, estoppel, 
and prejudgment interest and then decertified the class, 
pursuant to CUNA‟s motion for decertification.    
CUNA appeals that part of the District Court‟s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Meyer on the interpretation of 
the definition of “Total Disability” as well as its Permanent 
Injunction and Final Judgment.  On cross-appeal, Meyer 
argues that the District Court erred in not applying the theory 
of estoppel or waiver to the class members‟ claims for 
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damages and in not awarding prejudgment interest to the class 
members‟ benefits.1  
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
District Court‟s grant of summary judgment with respect to 
its interpretation of “Total Disability,” vacate its Permanent 
Injunction and Final Judgment, and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 i.  Factual Background 
Appellee James Meyer was a brakeman and conductor 
for Union Railroad for approximately 31 years.  On February 
24, 1999, Meyer purchased credit disability insurance, 
pursuant to a group policy issued by CUNA to the credit 
union, in connection with his automobile loan.  The policy 
provided that if Meyer became totally disabled, CUNA would 
make payments to the credit union covering Meyer‟s 
outstanding debt on his car loan.  The policy‟s definition of 
“Total Disability” provided: 
during the first 12 consecutive months of 
disability means that a member is not able to 
perform substantially all of the duties of his 
occupation on the date his disability 
commenced because of a medically determined 
sickness or accidental bodily injury.  After the 
first 12 consecutive months of disability, the 
definition changes and requires the member to 
be unable to perform any of the duties of his 
occupation or any occupation for which he is 
reasonably qualified by education, training or 
experience.   
(App. at 39.)  As required by Pennsylvania law, the policy 
was approved by the Pennsylvania Insurance Department.  
                                              
1
 Meyer does not appeal the remainder of the District Court‟s 
grant of summary judgment in favor of CUNA. 
5 
 
 Diane Konz (“Konz”), a CUNA employee, worked 
with a team of employees at CUNA to draft and submit 
insurance contracts to state regulators.  The drafting team 
included the manager of claims, the manager of underwriting, 
the manager of accounting, and an actuary.  Konz testified, 
during her deposition, that she drafted the policy language at 
issue during CUNA‟s efforts to modify policies to include 
plain language.   
On May 27, 2000, Meyer suffered a work place injury 
and filed a claim for disability benefits under his CUNA 
policy.  In response to the claim, CUNA awarded Meyer 
benefits for the period of July 7, 2000 to July 7, 2001, 
pursuant to the definition of “Total Disability,” that governed 
the first 12 months of disability.  CUNA found that Meyer 
was totally disabled according to the policy for that time 
period.  CUNA continued to pay Meyer benefits from July 8, 
2001 through November 24, 2002, as it found that Meyer was 
covered according to the definition regarding the post-12 
month period.   
Meyer visited his doctor, Dr. Antoin Munirji, on a 
monthly basis during this period, who provided CUNA with 
medical information about Meyer.  Pursuant to the policy‟s 
eligibility requirements, Meyer‟s physicians, including 
Munirji, regularly provided CUNA with updates regarding 
Meyer‟s disability status.  On several occasions, Meyer‟s 
physicians certified to CUNA that he was capable of 
returning to work in a sedentary, light, or medium duty 
capacity, which Meyer does not dispute.   
On January 27, 2003, CUNA notified Plaintiff that it 
was terminating his benefits based on information received 
from his physicians that Meyer could return to work in some 
capacity.  CUNA determined that Meyer was therefore no 
longer totally disabled as defined in the post-12 month period.  
CUNA sent Meyer a form letter which stated that “the 
information obtained indicated [he was] capable of modified 
light duty work.”  (App. at 41.)  That, “along with other 
information contained in [his] file,” indicated that he was “no 
longer unable to perform any occupation.”  (Id.)   
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Although Meyer was authorized by several physicians 
to return to work in some capacity subject to light or medium 
duty restrictions, he was never cleared by any physician to 
return to his time-of-injury occupation as a 
conductor/brakeman at Union Railroad.   
ii.  Procedural Background 
Subsequent to CUNA‟s termination of his benefits, 
Meyer brought an action in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania on behalf of himself 
and similarly situated individuals who were granted, and later 
denied, benefits (that is, disability payments on loan debt) 
under credit disability insurance policies they obtained from 
CUNA, pursuant to its definition of “Total Disability.”   
In his amended complaint, Meyer sought certification 
of a nationwide class based on claims for breach of contract, 
breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Pennsylvania Unfair 
Trade Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law, 73 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 201-1, et seq. (“UTPCPL”), violation of 
Pennsylvania‟s bad faith insurance statute, 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 8371 (“Section 8371”), and breach of 
Pennsylvania‟s common law covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.    
Before the District Court, Meyer argued that the policy 
definition of “Total Disability” was unambiguous and should 
be interpreted to mean that after the first 12 consecutive 
months, the insured qualifies as totally disabled if he can 
show either (1) that he is unable to perform the duties of his 
occupation; or (2) that he is unable to perform the duties of 
any occupation for which he is reasonably qualified by 
education, training, or experience.  CUNA submitted that the 
language in the policy created a shift from an “own 
occupation” definition of disability to an “any occupation” 
definition after 12 months and that the clause was 
unambiguous.  It argued that for coverage, a claimant must 
not be able to perform his duties and any of the duties of a job 
for which he was qualified. 
On December 16, 2004, the Court held a class 
certification hearing.  CUNA also filed a motion to dismiss 
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Meyer‟s amended complaint which, on December 20, 2004, 
the District Court granted as to the breach of fiduciary duty 
claim, granted, in part, as to the unfair trade practices claim, 
and denied, without prejudice, as to the breach of implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim.  On January 25, 
2006, the Court granted plaintiff‟s motion for class 
certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) 
for the following class of plaintiffs:
2
 
All persons who purchased disability insurance 
issued in Pennsylvania from the defendant 
CUNA Mutual Group, or its subsidiaries, which 
policies contain the definition of total disability 
including the following material language: 
„After the first twelve consecutive months of 
disability, the definition changes and requires 
the Member to be unable to perform any of the 
duties of his occupation, or any occupation for 
which he is reasonably qualified‟, [sic] to the 
extent that such individuals were determined by 
the defendant to be not able to perform all of the 
duties of his or her occupation, but were 
determined by the defendant to be capable of 
sufficient physical activity that the defendant 
decided that they were no longer eligible for 
total benefits under the defendant's 
interpretation of the subject policy. 
(App. at 38.)   
On February 5 and 6, 2007, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  Meyer moved for partial 
summary judgment on the District Court‟s interpretation of 
the “Total Disability” definition of the insurance contract.  
                                              
2
 For class notice purposes, CUNA determined that 4,734 
persons had received the benefit denial letter in question and 
potentially fell within the class definition; however, at the 
April 14, 2009 status conference before the District Court, 
Meyer‟s counsel stated that just under 3,000 claims members 
remained.    
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CUNA moved for summary judgment regarding all of 
Meyer‟s claims.  
On September 28, 2007, the District Court issued its 
summary judgment opinion granting Meyer‟s motion for 
partial summary judgment and resolving the policy definition 
of “Total Disability,” finding that it was ambiguous because 
both Meyer‟s and CUNA‟s proffered interpretations were 
reasonable;
3
 it therefore construed the definition in Meyer‟s 
favor.  In so finding, the District Court stated that any 
claimant who met the “own occupation” standard of the 
second clause (and could not perform the duties of his pre-
injury occupation duties after 12 months) would “be totally 
disabled within the meaning of the policy.”  (App. at 55.)   
The District Court also granted in part, and denied in 
part, CUNA‟s motion for summary judgment.  It granted the 
motion regarding Meyer‟s unfair trade practices claim, breach 
of good faith and fair dealing claim, and violation of bad faith 
insurance statute claim.  For Meyer‟s bad faith insurance 
claim, the Court reiterated that it found CUNA‟s 
interpretation of the “Total Disability” definition was 
reasonable, even more so, than Meyer‟s, and that Meyer 
produced no evidence of a dishonest purpose or ill will on 
CUNA‟s part that would constitute bad faith under the 
relevant Pennsylvania statute.   
The District Court also denied CUNA‟s motion with 
respect to count two—breach of contract—finding that 
because it had granted Meyer‟s motion for summary 
judgment on contract interpretation, CUNA was “liable for 
breaching the contract for terminating the benefits of any 
class member who could not return to his time of injury job.”  
(App. at 55.)  The District Court noted, however, that there 
was “sufficient evidence of record to create a material 
                                              
3
 In fact, based on its analysis on summary judgment, the 
District Court agreed with CUNA that its interpretation of 
“Total Disability” was more reasonable than Meyer‟s, 
however, it recognized that where an ambiguity exists in an 
insurance contract in Pennsylvania.  It must be construed in 
favor of the insured.  (App. at 54.) 
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question of fact . . . as to the remaining issues under the 
breach of contract claim, namely (1) which of the potential 
members is actually a member of the class, and (2) what are 
the damages for each class member.”  (Id.)    
Following its summary judgment ruling, the District 
Court noted that the only remaining issue to be resolved was 
CUNA‟s potential liability for breach of contract.  CUNA 
then filed a motion to decertify the class based on its 
argument that the damages issue would require detailed, 
individual inquiries that were not appropriate for class action 
treatment.   
 The District Court allowed briefing from both parties 
on the subject of a claims process.  The District Court held 
hearings on the matter on July 27, 2009 and September 14, 
2009, where it considered numerous aspects of efficiency, 
including fairness to the class members.   
On September 21, 2009, following the hearings, the 
District Court entered a Permanent Injunction and Final 
Judgment.  The District Court found that in light of its 
interpretation of the policy provision on summary judgment, 
“there remain[ed] triable issues of fact regarding only 
Defendant‟s potential liability for breach of contract.”  (Id. at 
3-4.)  The District Court “reserve[d] jurisdiction and 
discretion to take such further action as may be necessary or 
appropriate to implement, enforce, or modify the provisions 
of th[e] Order for a period of two (2) years after the date of 
entry of th[e] Order.”  (Id. at 3, ¶ 1.)   
The District Court also laid out an extensive claims 
process.  It required CUNA to process completed claim forms 
in accordance with a timeline and guidelines laid out by the 
District Court using the District Court‟s interpretation of 
“Total Disability.”  If CUNA chose to dispute a claim, 
claimants could notify CUNA and appeal to the District Court 
Judge.  The District Court noted that it “[t]hereby retain[ed] 
jurisdiction of all matters relating to the interpretation, 
administration, implementation, effectuation and enforcement 
of this Injunction and this Final Judgment, including, without 
limitation, the provisions of Part II of this Final Judgment and 
Order.”  (Id. at 6.)   
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Anticipating its immediate ruling on the decertification 
of the class that day, the Court acknowledged that the 
remaining issues in the case did not satisfy the requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for 
class certification, and that it “[would] be entering an Order 
granting CUNA Mutual‟s Motion to Decertify the Class.”  
(Id. at 4.)  That same day, in a separate order, the District 
Court decertified the class subsequent to its Permanent 
Injunction and Final Judgment.
4
  See Id. at 660.  In its Final 
Judgment, the District Court found that “the remaining issues 
to be adjudicated d[id] not satisfy the requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3) for class 
certification,” and so it would be entering an order granting 
CUNA‟s motion to decertify the class.  (Id. at 4.)5    
 On October 16, 2009, CUNA appealed the District 
Court‟s judgment.  On November 3, 2009, the District Court 
granted CUNA‟s motion to stay the Permanent Injunction and 
Final Judgment pending the outcome of the instant appeal.   
CUNA appeals the District Court‟s summary judgment ruling 
with respect to its interpretation of “Total Disability,” and the 
District Court‟s Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment.  
Meyer filed a Cross-Appeal seeking review of the District 
Court‟s decision not to apply the doctrines of estoppel or 
waiver to the class members‟ claims and to deny claimants 
prejudgment interest with respect to their claims.  
                                              
4
 CUNA asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in 
its initial class certification of Meyer‟s claims based on the 
same argument against the permanent injunction—that the 
individualized analyses into the circumstances of each class 
members‟ disability claims destroys the typicality, 
predominance, and superiority requirements of Rules 23(a) 
and 23(b)(2).  To the extent that CUNA attempts to contest 
the District Court‟s initial certification, that issue has already 
been decided by the District Court, and is not before us on 
appeal.   
5
 As Meyer did not seek review of the class decertification, 
the appeal comes before us decertified, which means that all 
putative class members now have to assert their claims 
individually.  
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II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction over this matter based on 
diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  We 
have jurisdiction over this matter, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.  We review a district court‟s grant of summary 
judgment de novo.  See Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott 
Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 580 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment 
is appropriate “if, drawing all inferences in favor of the 
nonmoving party, „the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure 
materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.‟”  Id. at 581 (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).   
We review a district court‟s grant of a permanent injunction 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Bell, 414 F.3d 474, 
478 (3d Cir. 2005).  Our review of a district court‟s award of 
equitable relief, like estoppel or waiver, is also for abuse of 
discretion.  James v. Richman, 547 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The court‟s decision to award prejudgment interest in 
an action based on diversity of citizenship is a question of 
state law.  See Jarvis v. Johnson, 668 F.2d 749, 741 (3d Cir. 
1982).  We review a district court‟s interpretation of 
Pennsylvania law de novo.  See Staff Builders Of 
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Koschitzki, 989 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir. 
1993).   
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Interpretation of “Total Disability” 
Definition in Summary Judgment Ruling 
The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law 
applies in this diversity matter.  Under Pennsylvania law, an 
insurance contract is governed by the law of the state in 
which the contract was made.  Crawford v. Manhattan Life 
Ins. Co. of New York, 221 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1966).  
“The interpretation of the scope of coverage of an insurance 
contract is a question of law properly decided by the court.”  
Regents of Mercersburg College v. Republic Franklin Ins. 
Co., 458 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Med. Protective 
Co. v. Watkins, 198 F.3d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal 
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quotation marks omitted)).  The goal of that task is “to 
ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the 
language of the written instrument.”  J.C. Penney Life Ins. 
Co. v. Pilosi, 393 F.3d 356, 363 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
Standard Venetian Blind Co. v Am. Empire Ins. Co., 469 
A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The policy definition of “Total Disability” provides: 
during the first 12 consecutive months of 
disability means that a member is not able to 
perform substantially all of the duties of his 
occupation on the date his disability 
commenced because of a medically determined 
sickness or accidental bodily injury.  After the 
first 12 consecutive months of disability, the 
definition changes and requires the member to 
be unable to perform any of the duties of his 
occupation or any occupation for which he is 
reasonably qualified by education, training or 
experience. 
(App. at 39.)  Meyer contends, as he did before the District 
Court, that this language is unambiguous and means that after 
the first 12 consecutive months, the insured qualifies as 
totally disabled if he can show either (1) that he is unable to 
perform the duties of his occupation; or (2) that he is unable 
to perform the duties of any occupation for which he is 
reasonably qualified by education, training, or experience.   
CUNA argues that the clause should not be interpreted 
that way because the policy creates a shift from an “own 
occupation” definition of disability to an “any occupation” 
definition after 12 months.  In effect, in the phrase, “or any 
occupation for which he is reasonably qualified by education, 
training or experience,” the “or” should be read conjunctively 
as, “and.”  
Applying Pennsylvania law, the District Court found 
that the definition of “Total Disability” was ambiguous.  
Although the Court found CUNA‟s interpretation of “Total 
Disability” more reasonable than Meyer‟s, it noted that its 
role was not to pick the most reasonable interpretation, but, 
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where two reasonable interpretations creating an ambiguity 
exist, to choose the interpretation favoring the insured.  Taken 
in the context of the overall policy and applying the plain 
meaning of “words and phrases,” it found Meyer‟s 
interpretation reasonable, since the ordinary meaning of “or” 
suggested a choice between two alternatives.  (Id. at 54.)   
CUNA claims that the District Court erred in 
concluding that Meyer‟s interpretation was reasonable and 
further argues that there was no evidence in the record of 
Meyer‟s intent to enter the insurance contract under that 
definition.  CUNA also argues that adoption of Meyer‟s 
interpretation is unreasonable because it allegedly violates 
Pennsylvania law, including its rules of insurance policy 
construction and applicable regulations governing credit 
disability insurance coverage.   
After examining the parties‟ conflicting 
interpretations, relevant case law, the policy‟s language and 
purpose as a whole, and Pennsylvania principles of contract 
construction, we conclude, as did the District Court, that the 
definition of Total Disability is ambiguous and must be 
construed in favor of Meyer, the insured. 
 The rules of analysis of insurance policies in 
Pennsylvania are well established.  Regents, 458 F.3d at 171 
(citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
632 F.2d 1068, 1075 (3d Cir. 1980)).  The goal of interpreting 
an insurance policy, like that of interpreting any other 
contract, is to determine the intent of the parties.  It begins 
with the language of the policy.  See Madison Constr. Co. v. 
Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999).  A 
policy must be read as a whole and its meaning construed 
according to its plain language.  Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co., 
Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Melrose Hotel Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 432 F. 
Supp. 2d 488, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2006).   
The burden of drafting with precision rests with the 
insurance company, the author of the policy.  Pilosi, 393 F.3d 
at 365.  An ambiguity in contract language exists “when the 
questionable term or language, viewed in the context of the 
entire policy, is „reasonably susceptible of different 
14 
 
constructions and capable of being understood in more than 
one sense.‟”  Id. at 363 (quoting Med. Protective, 198 F.3d at 
103); see also Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 100.  Where a 
term is ambiguous, it is to be construed against the insurer, in 
favor of the insured.  McMillan v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co. 
of Am., 922 F.2d 1073, 1075 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing Standard 
Venetian Blind, 469 A.2d at 566).  “The policy rationale 
underlying strict application of the doctrine is that because 
most insurance agreements are drafted by the insurance 
industry, they are essentially contracts of adhesion.”  Pittson 
Co. Ultramar Am. Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 520 
(3d Cir. 1997) (applying New Jersey law). 
 “Where, however, the language of the contract is clear 
and unambiguous, a court is required to give effect to that 
language.”  Madison Constr., 735 A.2d at 106.  Courts should 
not distort the meaning of the language or strain to find an 
ambiguity.  Id.; Pacific Indem. Co. v. Linn, 766 F.2d 754, 761 
(3d Cir. 1985).  A contract is not rendered ambiguous merely 
because the parties disagree about its construction.  Williams 
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 750 A.2d 881, 885 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2000).    
The instant case is not the typical one where a 
technical term appearing in a policy is undefined within the 
policy.  In this case, the actual policy term in dispute, “Total 
Disability,” is defined in the policy; however, the language in 
that definition itself is at issue.  Specifically, CUNA‟s use of 
the word “or” in the second clause of the post-12 month 
definition must be subject to scrutiny to edify the definition of 
“Total Disability.”   
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has not 
interpreted “or” in this particular context.  “In the absence of 
a definitive ruling by a state‟s highest court, we must predict 
how that court would rule if faced with the issue.”  Covington 
v. Cont‟l Gen. Tire, Inc., 381 F.3d 216, 218 (3d Cir. 2004).  
In so doing, “„we must look to decisions of state intermediate 
appellate courts, of federal courts interpreting that state‟s law, 
and of other state supreme courts that have addressed the 
issue,‟ as well as to „analogous decisions, considered dicta, 
scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending 
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convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would 
decide the issue at hand.‟”  Spence v. ESAB Group, Inc., 623 
F.3d 212, 216-17 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Norfolk S. Ry. Co. 
v. Basell USA Inc., 512 F.3d 86, 92 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
Looking first to the plain language of the definition, 
we note that in Pennsylvania, when words of common usage 
are used in an insurance policy, they should be construed in 
their natural, plain and ordinary sense.  Madison Constr., 735 
A.2d at 108 (citing Easton v. Washington Cnty. Ins. Co., 137 
A.2d 332, 335 (Pa. 1957)).   
The court may also look to the dictionary definition.  
Genaeya Corp v. Harco Nat‟l Ins. Co., 991 A.2d 342, 347 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (citing Wall Rose Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Manross, 939 A.2d 958, 962 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)).  Merriam 
Webster‟s Eleventh Collegiate Dictionary (2005) defines “or” 
as “—used as a function word to indicate an alternative.”  
Pennsylvania‟s intermediate appellate court has made a 
similar finding.  See Frenchak v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 495 
A.2d 1385, 1387 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (interpreting a lease 
and noting that “[t]he pertinent dictionary definition of „or‟ is 
„choice between alternative things, states, or courses.‟”) 
(citations omitted).     
In the statutory interpretation context, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also held that “[t]he word 
„or‟ is defined as a conjunction used to connect words, 
phrases, or clauses representing alternatives.”  In re Paulmier, 
937 A.2d 364, 373 (Pa. 2007) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).
6
  Though this definition appears in the context of 
                                              
6
 In a New Jersey class action insurance contract dispute, we 
found that in the provision of a local controversy requirement, 
which required that “principal injuries resulting from the 
alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant 
were incurred in the State in which the action was originally 
filed,” the plaintiff‟s argument that “the disjunctive” or 
should be interpreted as a “conjunctive” “and” was 
unavailing.  We affirmed the District Court‟s finding that the 
plaintiff‟s interpretation was “at odds with the plain language 
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the court‟s statutory interpretation, we find it instructive.  The 
commonly used and understood definition of “or” suggests an 
alternative between two or more choices.   
CUNA points to a 1942 Pennsylvania Superior Court 
case, Kensington Nat‟l Bank of Philadelphia v. Sampson, 26 
A.2d 115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1942), to support its proposition that 
“and” can be substituted for “or” depending on the context of 
the language involved.  We find Kensington distinguishable 
and unpersuasive.  It involved a life insurance policy which 
insured the lives of a husband and wife and provided for 
payment to the survivor upon either spouse‟s death.  The 
superior court affirmed the trial court‟s finding that “the 
whole essence of the contract,” called a “joint policy,” and 
whose premium was payable during the “joint lifetime” of the 
insured, “was to give to one benefits upon the death of the 
other.  To allow one person to change it destroys the whole 
plan of insurance and clearly the intention of the parties.”7  Id. 
at 117-18.  Although the context of that policy required a 
conjunctive reading, we do not find such obvious intent in the 
context of this case; one is certainly not required to read the 
clause conjunctively, and in that sense, do not find that 
Meyer‟s disjunctive reading is unreasonable.   
Our conclusion that Meyer‟s disjunctive interpretation 
of “or” is reasonable is further supported by the fact that we 
may consider “whether alternative or more precise language, 
if used, would have put the matter beyond reasonable 
question” in resolving ambiguity. 8  Vlastos v. Sumitomo 
                                                                                                     
of the provision.”  Kaufman v. Allstate New Jersey Ins. Co., 
561 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2009).    
7
 Alternatively, CUNA cites to cases from other circuits 
interpreting federal or state law outside of Pennsylvania, 
which are not controlling, that interpret the definition of “or” 
in a dissimilar context.  These references are likewise 
unpersuasive in showing that Meyer‟s interpretation is 
unreasonable.   
8
 Curiously, CUNA refers to its “intended use of the word 
„or‟ in the „total disability‟ definition.”  (Appellant‟s Reply 
Br. at 21) (emphasis added).  We frankly cannot reconcile this 
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Marine & Fire Ins. Co. (Europe) Ltd., 707 F.2d 775, 778 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (citing Celley v. Mut. Benefit Health and Accident 
Ass‟n, 324 A.2d 430, 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  Here, if CUNA had used the word 
“and” instead of “or” to convey that it indeed intended a 
conjunctive meaning in the second clause of the definition, it 
would have put the matter “beyond reasonable question” in 
resolving ambiguity.
9
 
CUNA advances numerous arguments about why 
Meyer‟s interpretation, the interpretation ultimately adopted 
by the District Court, is unreasonable.  Based on our analysis 
of a plain reading of the language and common, disjunctive 
meaning of the word “or,” we find that Meyer‟s interpretation 
is not unreasonable.   
Regarding CUNA‟s next argument that Meyer‟s 
interpretation is unreasonable as repugnant to Pennsylvania 
law, we recognize that in Pennsylvania, “stipulations in a 
contract of insurance in conflict with, or repugnant to, 
statutory provisions which are applicable to, and 
consequently form a part of, the contract, must yield to the 
statute, and are invalid, since contracts cannot change existing 
statutory laws.”  Pennsylvania Nat‟l Mut. Cas. Co. v. Black, 
916 A.2d 569, 579 (Pa. 2007) (citing Prudential Prop. and 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Colbert, 813 A.2d 747, 751 (Pa. 2002) 
(internal citations omitted)).   
                                                                                                     
position, given the common disjunctive meaning of “or,” with 
CUNA‟s proffered interpretation—a conjunctive meaning. 
9
 We also note that CUNA, in its form letter to Meyer 
informing him that it would no longer pay his benefits, stated 
that according to his credit disability insurance contract 
definition of Total Disability, “[a]fter the initial 12 
consecutive months of disability, the definition changes and 
states that you must be disabled from performing any 
occupation for which you are reasonably qualified by 
education, training, or experience,” which does not include 
the “any duties of his occupation or” part of the clause listed 
in Meyer‟s policy definition.  (App. at 41.) 
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CUNA argues that 31 Pa. Code § 73.11(4) (1971), a 
Pennsylvania Department of Insurance regulation in place at 
the time the policy was drafted, mandates a shift for coverage 
after 12 months from an own occupation standard to an any 
occupation standard for disability insurers who charge prima 
facie rates.
10
   
The regulation provided, in relevant part: 
The following premium rate standards are 
applicable to policies providing credit accident 
and health coverage which are issued with or 
without evidence of insurability offered to all 
debtors and containing: 
*** 
(4) No definition of disability which 
defines disability during the first 12 months of 
disability as inability to perform any 
occupation.  The definition of disability during 
such time period must be related to the 
occupation of the borrower at the time such 
disability occurs.  Thereafter, disability will be 
defined as the inability to perform any gainful 
occupation for which the borrower is reasonably 
fitted by education, training and experience. 
31 PA. CODE § 73.11(4) (1971).  The District Court found that 
the regulation was a list of attributes in a credit insurance 
contract for the policy to qualify for “premium rate 
standards.”11  We agree with the District Court‟s assessment.  
                                              
10
 The District Court acknowledged that what was referred to 
as “premium rate standards” in 1971 are now referred to as 
“prima facie rates” under 31 PA. CODE § 73.107(b).  CUNA 
does not dispute this finding on appeal, and we use the terms 
here interchangeably, presuming in CUNA‟s favor that it was 
charging these rates at the time of Meyer‟s purchase.   
11
 The District Court noted that 31 PA. CODE § 73.11(4) 
(1971) was amended in 1998 as 31 PA. CODE § 73.107(a)(5) 
(1998).   It concluded that the latter regulation, in place at the 
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The statute lists the requirements for an insurer that wishes to 
charge prima facie rates; however, the statute does not 
indicate that the insurer is required to charge prima facie 
rates. 
CUNA argues that record evidence supports charging 
prima facie rates for its group credit disability insurance 
coverage.  Assuming this is the custom and practice in the 
industry, CUNA has not presented evidence that under 
Pennsylvania law, it is required to charge prima facie rates 
and therefore required to utilize an “own” to “any” 
occupation shift in its definition of Total Disability.  
Notwithstanding that this evidence may otherwise support 
CUNA‟s proffered intent and its reasonableness, it is not 
evidence of Meyer‟s intent.   
Furthermore, under Pennsylvania law, in close cases, a 
court should resolve the meaning of insurance policy 
provisions in favor of coverage for the insured.  Motley v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 466 A.2d 609, 611 (Pa. 1983) 
(“[I]f [a court] should err in determining the meaning of an 
insurance policy provision . . . , [its] error should be in favor 
of coverage for the insured.”).   Additionally, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that “[i]n the insurance 
setting, a policy of insurance may expand, but cannot reduce, 
                                                                                                     
time of Meyer‟s purchase of insurance in 1999, is concerned 
with the proof required for disability, and not the definition of 
Total Disability.  Additionally, it noted that the new 
regulation clearly allows for alternate benefit plans that differ 
from the features enumerated in section 73.107(a)(1-7).   
Thus, the District Court found that the 1998 regulation 
would apply to Meyer‟s policy and CUNA‟s argument that 
the parties were bound by the terms of the 1971 regulation 
would be incorrect.  Nevertheless, since the 1971 regulation 
was in effect when some of the class members bought their 
insurance policies, the District Court analyzed the 1971 
regulation to determine if Meyer‟s interpretation of “Total 
Disability” was prohibited by law.  CUNA does not address 
this issue in its brief on appeal. 
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coverage that is mandated by statute.”  Burstein v. Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 809 A.2d 204, 220 (Pa. 2002).   
We also find unpersuasive CUNA‟s last argument that 
Meyer‟s interpretation is unreasonable because it allegedly 
conflicts with industry custom and practice.  CUNA cites to 
Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. 
Co., 579 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2009), where we stated that, 
among other factors in determining ambiguity in an insurance 
contract, a court may look to industry custom and practice.  In 
that case, a title insurance policy dispute arose between two 
insurance companies over whether rights of first refusal not 
explicitly listed were covered by the policy, and we looked to 
the title insurance industry‟s treatment of American Land 
Title Association Endorsements.  We found against defendant 
drafter of the policy, and concluded that along with the text 
and purpose of the policy, the custom and practice of the title 
insurance industry also led to the same result.  Id. at 311 
(finding that the alternate result “r[an] roughshod over the 
policy‟s language, purpose, and usage.”).   
Here, the text of the policy definition does not align 
with drafter CUNA‟s evidence of custom and industry 
practice.  The plain language of the provision is not consistent 
with CUNA‟s evidence of custom and industry practice.  
CUNA makes no allegation and presents no evidence of 
Meyer‟s awareness of this industry practice or custom.  Thus, 
CUNA‟s additional evidence, though arguably enlightening 
regarding its own intent, does not change our belief that 
Meyer‟s interpretation, based on the plain language of the 
provision, is reasonable.   
Along this vein, CUNA claims that its interpretation is 
the only reasonable one because Meyer‟s proposed 
interpretation renders half of the definition‟s terms 
meaningless by reading out the shift in the policy—that after 
12 months, “it changes.”  “[T]his Court takes care not to 
render other portions of a provision or contract superfluous 
when construing contract language.”  New Castle Cnty., 
Delaware v. Nat‟l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 174 
F.3d 338, 349 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Delaware law) (citing 
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Contrans, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 836 F.2d 163, 169 
(3d Cir. 1987) (applying Pennsylvania law)).   
CUNA‟s argument, however, is unavailing, by looking 
at the language of the definition in context.  The plain 
language in the first clause, modifying own occupation, could 
certainly be read to shift from requiring a claimant to show 
that he cannot perform “substantially all” of the duties—less 
than all of those duties—to not being able to perform “any” of 
the duties.  This puts a greater onus on a claimant to meet the 
threshold for coverage after the first 12 months of disability.   
However, we recognize that reading the phrase 
conjunctively creates an ambiguity if the duties of “any 
occupation” for which a claimant is reasonably qualified is 
read as being inclusive of his prior occupation.  Looking at 
the post-12 month clause in the order in which it is written—
first to one‟s abilities with respect to his own occupation—
would eliminate a need to continue reading the second part of 
the clause to determine whether one can perform duties of 
any occupation, if “any occupation” includes “the duties of 
one‟s former occupation.”   
Under that premise, after 12 months, an insured could 
be in one of two situations with respect to his own 
occupation.  He could either (1) be able to perform none of 
the duties of his former occupation; or (2) be able to perform 
one or some of the duties of his former occupation.  If he 
cannot perform any of the duties of his occupation, construing 
'or' disjunctively, he is qualified for coverage, and there is no 
need to move to the second part of the clause—whether he 
can perform the duties of any occupation for which he is 
qualified—to determine coverage.  If, on the other hand, an 
insured can perform one or more tasks of his former 
occupation, he is not qualified for coverage and there is no 
need to look to the second part of the clause because he has 
already failed to qualify for coverage—his own occupation is 
a subset of any occupation for which he is qualified.  Courts 
should not distort the meaning of the language or strain to 
find an ambiguity.  Madison, 735 A.2d at 106.  However, 
such a reading is not a distortion; it does create some degree 
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of ambiguity, making the phrase “capable of being 
understood in more than one sense.”   
Notwithstanding this potential contextual defect, we 
will not override our conclusion that Meyer‟s interpretation of 
Total Disability is reasonable when the plain language, 
written by CUNA, offers an otherwise reasonable reading.  
Cf. New Castle Cnty, 174 F.3d at 350 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(applying Delaware law) (finding that the potential defect of 
rendering the word “wrongful” surplusage in an insurance 
contract in certain contexts would not override the conclusion 
that the plaintiff‟s interpretation was reasonable when that 
defect itself was subject to competing interpretations and only 
a potential infirmity).  However, this reading does lead us to 
find that the phrase is capable of being understood in more 
than one sense and that a conjunctive interpretation is also 
reasonable.
12
    
We thus find that the definition of Total Disability is 
ambiguous as it is capable of being understood in more than 
one sense.  However, as noted earlier, in Pennsylvania, “a 
court construes ambiguities in an insurance policy strictly 
against the insurer.”  USX Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 444 
F.3d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Standard Venetian Blind, 
469 A.2d at 566).  
Construing the ambiguity against CUNA, we find that 
Meyer should have been covered after the first twelve months 
while he could not perform any of the duties of his former 
occupation.  We will affirm the District Court‟s 
interpretation.   
                                              
12
 Still, reading the phrase conjunctively leads to other 
problems in addition to the commonly understood meaning of 
“or.”  Reading the phrase conjunctively, one could argue that 
inclusion of continued coverage if one cannot perform “any 
of the duties of one‟s former occupation” is redundant or 
unnecessary if “duties of any occupation for which one is 
reasonably qualified” includes one‟s own occupation. 
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B. District Court’s Award of Relief in 
 Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment 
 
CUNA next appeals the District Court‟s September 21, 
2009 Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment.
13
  We review 
a District Court‟s decision to grant a permanent injunction 
under an abuse of discretion standard.  Citizens Fin. Group, 
Inc. v. Citizens Nat‟l Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 126 
(3d Cir. 2004).  “An abuse of discretion exists where the 
District Court‟s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous 
finding of fact, and errant conclusion of law, or an improper 
application of law to fact.”  A.C.L.U. of New Jersey v. Black 
Horse Pike Reg‟l Bd. of Educ., 84 F.3d 1471, 1476 (3d Cir. 
1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e 
will not interfere with the district court‟s exercise of 
discretion unless there is a definite and firm conviction that 
the court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the 
conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant 
factors.”  Morgan v. Perry, 142 F.3d 670, 683 (3d Cir. 1998) 
(citing Hanover Potato Products, Inc. v. Shalala, 989 F.2d 
123, 127 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 CUNA claims that the District Court abused its 
discretion because the Permanent Injunction awarded 
impermissibly broad relief on behalf of the former class 
members.  Specifically, CUNA asserts that the District 
Court‟s injunction improperly imposed restrictions on CUNA 
                                              
13
 In deciding summary judgment, after finding that any 
claimant who met the “own occupation” standard or the “any 
occupation” standard would be totally disabled within the 
meaning of the policy, the District Court did not address 
damages or CUNA‟s liability with respect to each class 
member because these individualized issues had not yet been 
litigated.  In its Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment, 
prior to decertifying the class, the District Court noted that 
subsequent to its summary judgment ruling on the 
interpretation of the policy provision, “there remain triable 
issues of fact regarding only Defendant‟s potential liability 
for breach of contract.”  (App. at 3-4.)   
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in its claims process for policyholders and improperly 
retained jurisdiction over claims process issues even after the 
District Court had decertified the class.  CUNA further argues 
that the District Court, after decertifying the class, should 
have let the former class members pursue individual breach of 
contract claims, rather than enjoining CUNA from construing 
the policy definition differently and allowing former class 
members to pursue their disability benefits through the claims 
process.
14
     
Meyer responds that the District Court still had 
jurisdiction over the claims of the entire class at the time that 
it ordered injunctive relief for the class because it decertified 
the class immediately after.  Additionally, Meyer asserts that 
following the District Court‟s Final Judgment, no individual 
issues remained to be resolved because in Meyer‟s view, the 
District Court essentially ordered specific performance of the 
CUNA contract regarding each of the class members.   
District courts are afforded considerable discretion in 
framing injunctions.  Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, 787 F.2d 875, 887-90, adopted in part on reh’g by, 
809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 958 
(1988), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988) (citing Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200 (1973)).  “Nevertheless, 
injunctive relief should be no broader than necessary to 
provide full relief to the aggrieved party.”  Ameron, 787 F.2d 
at 888 (citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 
(1979)); see Madsen v. Women‟s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 
753, 765 (1994) (noting that an injunction should be no 
broader than necessary to achieve its desired goals).   
In its Permanent Injunction, the District Court ordered 
CUNA to follow certain procedures to process the claims 
forms, including processing the forms in accordance with the 
                                              
14
 CUNA also asserts that the claims adjudication process 
created by the District Court‟s Permanent Injunction and 
Final Judgment adopts proof presumptions that vary from 
those contained in the forms approved by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Insurance.  Because we find the injunction 
overbroad for other reasons, we do not reach this argument. 
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District Court‟s guidelines and using only the Court‟s 
interpretation of “Total Disability.”  Additionally, the District 
Court‟s Permanent Injunction provided that if a claimant 
opposed the outcome of CUNA‟s determination, he could file 
a motion for contempt with the District Court, which, after 
giving CUNA the opportunity to respond, would then review 
CUNA‟s denial of the claim for benefits.  If the District Court 
determined that CUNA improperly denied benefits, it would 
award prejudgment interest to the claimant from the date of 
denial.   
The District Court reserved for itself jurisdiction over 
the entire claims process, noting that it “retain[ed] jurisdiction 
of all matters relating to the interpretation, administration, 
implementation, effectuation and enforcement of this 
Injunction and this Final Judgment.”  (App. at 6.)   
The procedural posture here is seemingly unique and is 
the source of our concern.
15
  We believe the District Court 
abused its discretion in issuing an injunction in which it 
retained jurisdiction over the class members‟ claims 
throughout the claims procedure process after the class was 
decertified.  We are guided by the principle that “[i]n the 
absence of a certified class action, [a plaintiff] [i]s only 
entitled to relief for itself.”16  Ameron, 787 F.2d at 888 (citing 
Nat‟l Ctr. for Immigrant Rights v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1371-
72 (9th Cir. 1984); Davis v. Romney, 490 F.2d 1360, 1366 
(3d Cir. 1974)).   
                                              
15
 At oral argument, counsel for Meyer acknowledged that he 
was not aware of any decision where a court retained 
jurisdiction over class members‟ claims where it subsequently 
decertified that class. 
  
16
 It is a regular practice for a trial court to retain jurisdiction 
over the enforcement of a settlement agreement.  See, e.g., 
Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937, 942 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“federal district courts have no inherent authority to enforce 
a settlement once a final judgment has been entered, but may 
do so if the agreement expressly retains jurisdiction in the 
court for enforcement purposes.”) (citing Kokkonen v. 
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381 (1994)).    
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Additionally, in the context of an opt-in class, where 
the district court denied class certification for an action under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, we have held that “[a] court 
which rejects a class as improper has no power to bind class 
members not properly before it.”  Lusardi v. Lechner, 855 
F.2d 1062, 1079 (3d Cir. 1988).  In Lusardi, the district court 
held that the timely filing of individual charges in an age 
discrimination lawsuit was necessary to the maintenance of 
individual actions by opt-in class members at a point in time 
when the class was not certified.  We found that “[t]he power 
to judge the merits of their individual claims lies with the 
forum in which those claims are presented. . . [a] district court 
has no power or jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the 
claims of individual members of a putative opt-in class when 
it denies class certification.  This is clear legal error.”  Id.  
Others circuits have also found injunctions to be 
overbroad where their relief amounted to class-wide relief 
and no class was certified.  See, e.g., Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 
F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2003) (“While district courts are not 
categorically prohibited from granting injunctive relief 
benefitting an entire class in an individual suit, such broad 
relief is rarely justified because injunctive relief should be no 
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide 
complete relief to the plaintiffs.”) (alteration in original) 
(citing Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 702); see also Culver v. City of 
Milwaukee, 277 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2002) (suit became an 
individual action when the class was decertified); Cf. Brown 
v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d 337, 361 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(“An injunction should be narrowly tailored to give only the 
relief to which plaintiffs are entitled.  Ordinarily, classwide 
relief, such as the injunction here which prohibits sex 
discrimination against the class of Boston University faculty, 
is appropriate only where there is a properly certified class. . . 
. But there is no such reason here for an injunction running to 
the benefit of nonparties.”) (citations omitted). 
Through its Permanent Injunction, the District Court 
put in place a process by which class members would be 
required to present their claims to CUNA, and CUNA would 
be required to process those claims applying the Court‟s 
interpretation of “Total Disability.”  The injunction also 
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required implementing particular burdens of proof on the 
claimants, and providing claimants recourse to the same 
District Court judge in the event that they were not satisfied 
with the outcome of the claims process, which may result in 
an award of prejudgment interest.  This relief was obviously 
not limited to Meyer, the only party plaintiff to the suit once 
the class was decertified.  Although the District Court entered 
the Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment before 
decertifying the class on the docket,
17
 at the point that the 
class was decertified,
18
 the relief was overly broad.  Once 
decertification became effective, the District Court had no 
jurisdiction over any of the claims of the putative class 
members and therefore no ability to order that any relief be 
granted to any claimant other than Meyer.   
Here, the claims process set forth and the District 
Court‟s assertion of jurisdiction effectively allowed the Court 
to retain jurisdiction over the claims of former class members 
despite decertification.  In other words, the relief granted in 
the Permanent Injunction was no longer narrowly tailored.  
We find that the District Court abused its discretion in 
awarding overly broad injunctive relief.  Even if the District 
Court had ruled on Meyer‟s claim, the relief in the form of the 
injunction would have been overly broad.  We will vacate the 
Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment and remand to the 
District Court for further action consistent with this opinion.  
                                              
17
 At the September 14, 2009 hearing, the District Court noted 
that it “ha[d] to do the injunction first and then . . . decertify 
the class.”  (App. at 781.)  
18
 When it decertified the class, the District Court noted that it 
did so “because the remaining issues to be adjudicated do not 
satisfy the requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
23(a) and 23(b)(3) for class certification.” (App. at 4.)  
Meyer, the class representative, does not appeal the 
decertification.   
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C.   Meyer’s Claims on Cross-Appeal  
i.  Estoppel, Waiver and Prejudgment Interests 
On cross-appeal, Meyer asserts that the District Court 
erred in failing to apply the theory of estoppel or waiver to 
the class members‟ claims for damages in its final judgment.  
Meyer also claims that the District Court failed to award 
prejudgment interest to the class members‟ claims.  We need 
not reach these issues.  They are moot given the District 
Court‟s decertification of the class because any determination 
by any court on the class members‟ behalf would fly in the 
face of decertification.  Additionally, there are no damages to 
award.   
As noted, we will vacate the District Court‟s 
Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment requiring CUNA to 
apply the District Court‟s interpretation of Total Disability 
and engage in the District Court-ordered claims process 
because we find that the Court‟s retention of jurisdiction 
taken together with the scope of the injunction awarded 
overly broad relief to the former class members.  Because of 
our disposition of that issue, we believe it would be premature 
to decide the issue of prejudgment interest at this time.  See, 
e.g., Fernandez v. Levin, 548 A.2d 1191, 1193 (Pa. 1988) (a 
plaintiff who succeeds on a contract claim is entitled to 
prejudgment interest).  Accordingly, we will vacate the 
District Court‟s denial of prejudgment interest.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court‟s ruling on summary judgment interpreting the policy 
definition in Meyer‟s favor that a subscriber is entitled to 
coverage under the benefit policy after 12 months if he can 
show that he is (1) unable to perform any of the duties of his 
occupation, or alternatively is able to show that he is (2) 
unable to perform any of the duties of any occupation for 
which he is reasonably qualified by education, training or 
experience.  We will also vacate and remand the District 
Court‟s order of Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment.   
